

Convoy 678N Engagement


Green Tab AAR




Background

- Mission: 1075th TC CO executes Iraqi Express mission to Theater Distribution Center at LSA Anaconda 20 March 2005.
- Convoy Organization:
 - Convoy Commander SSG Uhl (1075th)
 - 6 x M915/872s
 - 2 x M915 bobtails
 - 3 Gun truck HMMWV
 - 20 x IAP Tractor-Trailer Systems
 - 2 x IAP bobtails
 - 518th Gun truck escort SSG Vanroeckel (Call Sign Regulator)
 - 3 x Gun truck HMMWV
- Chronology
 - 19 March: Convoy picks up loads at TDC and arrives at Scania
 - 20 March: Convoy departs Scania enroute to LSAA via ASR Kiev/Bismark
 - 1125: Ambush Begins
 - 1210: Enemy Neutralized








Battle Chronology


- Convoy Schematic Diagram
- Battlefield sketches
 - Initial Activity
 - Lead Vehicle Advances
 - Bus IED'd
 - CEP moves into Kill Zone
 - Rear of convoy under attack
 - CEP withdrawal
 - RPG Grenade Attack
 - Trucks begin exiting kill zone
 - CEP Advance
 - Convoy receives fire from right side
 - Casualties moved
 - KYNG Soldier Recovery

- Casualty recovery
- Convoy moves out
- AT4 fired
- Ground Assault
- KYNG Soldier evacuated
- SPC Hubbard evacuated
- Pictures


Convoy Schematic Diagram




Initial Activity




Lead Vehicle Advances




Bus IED'd




CEP moves into Kill zone




Rear of convoy under attack




CEP withdrawal




Truck hit by RPG fire




Trucks move out of kill zone




CEP Advance




Convoy engaged from the right




Casualties moved




KYNG Soldier recovery




Casualty Recovery




Convoy Moves Out




AT4 fired




Ground Assault




KYNG Soldier Evacuated



SPC Hubbard Evacuated



Consolidation and Reorganization



Key Convoy Personnel

• SSG Uhl (Convoy Commander)

- Lead convoy 2 miles out of kill zone and set up secure casualty collection point

PFC Delancey

 After being struck twice in the helmet by gun fire and RPG, provided suppressive fire in order to keep the gun fire off of his vehicle and his injured co-driver, inflicting 2-6 casualties on insurgents

SPC Beck

 Radioed to convoy commander advising him to stay out of kill zone, extracted SGT Ricketts from his truck, and pulled him to a covered position behind another truck while under fire

• SPC Birkel & SPC Sharples

Ran 300-400 meters to front of convoy while under fire to recover SGT Ricketts, lifted him into a
white truck, got TCN and DoD drivers remounted and out of kill zone

SGT Brown

 Became base of fire with a M249 SAW against insurgent ground assault and developed plan to evacuate the wounded KYNG soldier

SGT Hernandez

 Applied first aid to wounded KYNG soldier, assisted in repelling the insurgent ground assault, and evacuated the wounded KYNG to the South CCP

SPC Schrad

 Provided suppressive fire along with the CEP positioned in the rear and neutralized enemy position, allowing for the recovery of SGT Ricketts

Lessons Learned

- Crew-served weapon malfunctions
 - Discussion: During the firefight, the .50 Cal MGs repeatedly misfired, resulting in secondary weapons (mostly M16s) being used to suppress large numbers of entrenched enemy with limited effect
 - Recommendation: Designated areas where soldiers can test-fire their weapons would enable soldiers to identify and correct deficiencies prior to an engagement
- Lack of AT4s or Mk19s enabled entrenched enemy to suppress convoy movement
 - Discussion: The insurgents were effectively using cover, concealment, and hasty emplacements which small arms fire was not able to penetrate; they were also massing fires from emplacements which an AT4 or Mk19 would have been able to neutralize
 - Recommendation: Convoys need to have either an AT4 or a Mk19 mounted on CEPs
- Convoy Commanders in task vehicles
 - Discussion: Due to a vehicle becoming NMC at Scania, the convoy commander had to couple his bobtail to the NMC vehicle's load. During the firefight, the convoy commander could not move around the battlefield to assess the situation due to the lack of mobility of the M915 tractor-trailor system.
 - Recommendation: Convoy commanders need to have a dedicated command and control vehicle (preferably HMMWVs)
- Intelligence on enemy situation was poor
 - Discussion: The location of the ambush had seen enemy activity for the two days prior to this convoy rolling through. The soldiers were not prepared as they could have been had there been a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield
 - Recommendation: S2 briefs not only need to focus on what has happened but also need to give the
 convoy commanders a overview of what the enemy might do in a given area.